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Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: The 
Challenges and Risks Facing the Joint Tribunal in 
Cambodia 
Katheryn M. Klein* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The time for justice is running out.  Over thirty years have passed since the Khmer 
Rouge took over Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, and overthrew the Khmer Repub lic in 
order to carry out their violent plan to transform Cambodia into an agrarian, communist 
society. 1  From April 1975 until January 1979, the Khmer Rouge subjected citizens to 
forced labor, torture and genocide.2  Two to three million Cambodians were forced to 
evacuate their urban homes and ordered into slave labor in the countryside.3  By the close 
of 1979, nearly one-fifth of the Cambodian population had been decimated by the Khmer 
Rouge.4 
¶2 The Khmer Rouge leaders are responsible for the deaths of 1.7 million5 of their 
own countrymen and to the present day have not been held accountable.6  The debate 
over the appropriate mechanism by which to try the Khmer Rouge leaders for their 
crimes was so protracted that members of the Khmer Rouge have been aging and some 
dying; leaving victims and their families without hope of bringing the Khmer Rouge 
leaders to justice.7  Pol Pot, the highest ranking Khmer Rouge leader known as “Brother 
 
 * Katheryn M. Klein, J.D. Candidate 2006, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. in Political 
Science and B.A. in History, University of California at Los Angeles (2002). 
1 Rachel S. Taylor, Better Late Than Never, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
SERIES, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 237, 238-39 (Jane 
E. Stromseth ed., Transnational Publishers 2003). 
2 Identical letters dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General 
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850 
at 2 (1999). 
3 TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 239. 
4 The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135 , 
53rd Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850, at 5 (1999). [hereinafter GROUP OF EXPERTS 
REPORT ]. 
5 Cf. id., at 13.  This source notes: “Scholars and Governments have offered differing totals for the 
number of Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge. Scholars have separately arrived at figures of 1.5 
million and nearly 1.7 million.
 
There was a sharp disparity among victim groups. One study posits close to 
a 100 per cent death rate for rural and urban ethnic Vietnamese, 25 per cent for urban and rural Khmer 
“new people”, and 15 per cent for rural Khmer ‘base people.’
 
Overall, the various estimates point to a death 
rate of approximately 20 per cent of the April 1975 population of 7.3 to 7.9 million people. Historians of 
Cambodia have rejected the figure of 2 to 3 million that has often been used by the Governments in 
Cambodia since 1979, as well as in some popular accounts.” 
6 Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw 
Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 893, 895 (2004). 
7 TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 237-38. 
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Number One,” died in 1998 and four years later Ke Pauk, another former Khmer Rouge 
leader, also died.8  Both men died with their freedom, never having to face accountability 
for their brutal crimes. 
¶3 On May 13, 2003, after years of negotiations regarding the judicial mechanism 
through which the Khmer Rouge should be brought to justice, the United Nations and 
Cambodian Government approved the “Draft Agreement between the United Nations and 
the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution of Crimes Committed 
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea” (March Agreement).9  The March 
Agreement consists of thirty-two articles and establishes the special chambers within the 
Cambodian court structure to prosecute former members of the Khmer Rouge.10  The 
tribunal, which will follow Cambodian law and utilize a combination of Cambodian and 
international judges,11 represents a new and untested approach to the prosecution of war 
crimes.12  In contrast to the completely international tribunals established in Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, the Khmer Rouge tribunal combines a minority of international judges and 
a majority of Cambodian judges to form a joint tribunal located in Cambodia.13  Article 3 
of the March Agreement establishes that the Trial Chambers shall be composed of three 
Cambodian judges and two international judges, while the Supreme Court Chamber, 
which will serve as the appellate chamber and chamber of final instance, shall consist of 
four Cambodian judges and three international judges.14 
¶4 The establishment of the joint tribunal as the accountability mechanism for trying 
former members of the Khmer Rouge is controversial, largely due to concerns that its 
structure is flawed and is, therefore, unlikely to effectively administer justice.15  The 
features of the tribunal, which present risks to its success, include: (1) lack of judicial 
independence due to interference by political manipulation of the Cambodian 
government,16 (2) no independent, international prosecutor,17 (3) the limited number of 
competent Cambodian judges18 and (4) a flawed supermajority formula.19  On March 31, 
2003, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed concern over these risks 
in his report to the General Assembly on the March Agreement.20 
 
8 Id. 
9 Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kapuchea, U.N. GAOR 3D Comm., 
57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b), U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (2003) [hereinafter MARCH AGREEMENT ]. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at Arts. 3, 12.  Article 12 further states that “Where Cambodia law does not deal with a particular 
matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the application of a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or 
where there is a question regarding the consistency of such rule with international standards, guidance may 
also be sought in procedural rules established at the international level.” 
12 Gerald V. May III, An Unlikely Culprit: Examining the U.N.’s Counterproductive Role in the 
Negotiations Over a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP . L. REV. 147, 149 (2004). 
13 Id. at 150. 
14 MARCH AGREEMENT , supra note 9, at Art. 3. 
15 Human Rights Watch, Serious Flaw: Why the U.N. General Assembly Should require Changes to the 
Draft Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/cambodia043003-bck.pdf 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Serious Flaw]. 
16 Id. at 3-4. 
17 Id. at 4-5. 
18 LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 897. 
19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Serious Flaw, supra note 15, at 5-6. 
20 Id. at 1-2. 
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I cannot but recall the reports of my Special Representative for human 
rights in Cambodia, who has consistently found there to be little respect on 
the part of Cambodian courts for the most elementary features of the right 
to a fair trial.  I consequently remain concerned that these important 
provisions of the draft agreement might not be fully respected by the 
Extraordinary Chambers and that established standards of international 
justice, fairness and due process might therefore not be ensured. 
Furthermore in view of the clear finding of the General Assembly in 
resolution 57/225 that there are continued problems related to the rule of 
law and the functioning of the judiciary in Cambodia resulting in 
interference by the executive and with the independence of the judiciary, I 
would very much have preferred that the draft agreement provide for both 
of the Extraordinary Chambers to be composed of a majority of 
international judges . . . .21 
The Security Council approved the March Agreement over the objections of the 
Secretariat and Kofi Annan. 22  Each of the concerns mentioned by Secretary-General 
Annan indicate that the structure of the joint tribunal, as devised in the March Agreement, 
may be flawed and collectively could result in the failure to provide justice for the 
victims of the Khmer Rouge. 
¶5 This Note will argue that the March Agreement fails to address the formidable risks 
involved in the establishment of a joint tribunal in Cambodia.  The Cambodian 
government still exercises control over the Cambodian judiciary and the presence of a 
majority of Cambodian judges likely will cause the tribunal to lack credibility in the eyes 
of Cambodians and the international community.23  Furthermore, the presence of 
international judges may prove to be an illusory safeguard, if they are unaware of 
governmental interference with the Cambodian judges.  Part II of this Note will provide 
historical background on Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime and specifically 
focus on the misguided utopian philosophies of the Khmer Rouge and the human rights 
violations they committed in an effort to achieve their goals.  Part III will trace the 
history of negotiations between Cambodia and the United Nations regarding the 
establishment of the joint tribunal and illustrate the lack of good faith exercised by the 
Cambodian government, which greatly prolonged the process.  Part IV will address the 
structure of the tribunal and analyze the risks facing the joint tribunal.  In closing, Part V 
contains a case study of the Special Court established in Sierra Leone and asserts that a 
Cambodian tribunal modeled after the Special Court may achieve several of the goals of 
the joint tribunal with substantially fewer risks. 
 
21 Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 109(b), at 11, U.N. 
Doc. A/57/769 (2003). 
22 Press release, United Nations, General Assembly Approves Draft Agreement Between UN, Cambodia 
on Khmer Rouge Trials, GA/10135 (May 13, 2003). 
23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Serious Flaw, supra note 15, at 1. 
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
¶6 April 17, 1975 signified the end of a decade- long struggle for power in Cambodia 
and the beginning of one of the worst human rights tragedies of the twentieth century. 24  
On that day, the Communist Party of the Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge took over 
Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, and overthrew the hereditary monarch, Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk, who ruled the Kingdom of Cambodia from independence in 1953 
until 1970.25  The events leading up to the fall of Phnom Penh weakened Cambodia’s 
political structure paving the way for the Khmer Rouge takeover.  Despite Sihanouk’s 
efforts to marginalize the Khmer Rouge, support from Vietnamese Communist leaders 
enabled the Khmer Rouge to persist as a powerful political force.26  Exactly one month 
before April 17, 1975, Prime Minister Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, 
Sihanouk’s cousin, overthrew Prince Sihanouk in a bloodless coup, while Sihanouk was 
visiting the Soviet Union and China.27  Prime Minister Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik 
Matak established the Khmer Republic, which was supported by the United States.28  The 
allegiance between the Khmer Republic and the United States during the Vietnam War 
further fueled the fires of the Khmer Rouge.29  The Khmer Rouge also had the support of 
North Vietnam and China.30  Ironically, after being overthrown, Sihanouk established an 
opposition government and allied with the Khmer Rouge, the very group he had 
attempted to marginalize during his monarchy. 31  North Vietnam and China’s support of 
the Khmer Rouge, coupled with the withdrawal of United States assistance in 1975, 
enabled the Khmer Rouge to secure power easily.32 
A. The Philosophy of the Khmer Rouge: The Push for Self-Reliance 
¶7 The misguided, utopian philosophies of the Khmer Rouge focused on the creation 
of a pure Khmer nation, “one completely sovereign and self- reliant, free from subjugation 
by foreign and class enemies.”33  The Khmer Rouge ideology has its roots in Marxism 
with the vision of creating a dictatorship of the proletariat.34  The Khmer Rouge was, in 
large part, motivated by the fear that countries surrounding Cambodia, in particular 
Vietnam, were threatening to take over Cambodia.35  In its quest for self-reliance, the 
Khmer Rouge sought to bring Cambodia to what it labeled “Year Zero,” through the 
 
24 JASON S. ABRAMS, STEVEN RATNER, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 267, (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2001); 
SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 87 (Basic Books 2002); 
Yale University, Cambodian Genocide Program, Introduction, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/cgpintro.html (last 
visited January 20, 2006). 
25 ABRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 




32 GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4 at 8; ABRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267. 
33 ABRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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creation of an agrarian utopia lacking any traces of modernity. 36  The regime launched a 
revolution in which “all pre-existing economic, social and cultural institutions were 
abolished, all foreign influences were expunged and the entire population was 
transformed into a collective work force.”37  The Khmer Rouge set out to kill anyone who 
could possibly thwart its goal of creating a new society, including those among its own 
ranks whom were viewed as potential dissidents.38  It perceived “intellectuals” such as 
doctors, teachers, lawyers, students and those capable of speaking a foreign language as 
particularly threatening.39  The Khmer Rouge was also highly suspicious of former 
members of the Khmer Republic as well as religious figures and ethnic minorities.40  The 
Khmer Rouge’s push toward a self-reliant system, driven by fear and paranoia, 
“eradicated money and markets, did away with private property, abolished formal 
education, shut hospitals, took children away from their parents, forced cultural 
minorities to abandon their customs, and destroyed organized religion.”41 
B. Implementation of the Khmer Rouge Vision of Society through Fear and Cruelty 
¶8 The first major step towards achieving this agrarian utopia involved the massive 
reorganization of the Cambodian population in 1978.42  The Khmer Rouge divided the 
country into zones that were each further divided into sectors to effectively exert control 
over the population. 43  The Cambodian people were organized into agricultural 
cooperatives in the countryside that were supervised by committees appointed by the 
Khmer Rouge.44  Phnom Penh served as the administrative center, through which the 
Khmer Rouge gave orders to regional and local officials.45 
¶9 The Khmer Rouge efficiently implemented its plan to concentrate the population, 
forcing between two and three million people to evacuate the cities and march into the 
countryside within a week of overthrowing the Khmer Republic.46  The merciless 
marches were indiscriminate and included the young, the elderly and the sick.  Witnesses 
report horrifying images of patients in Phnom Penh hospitals being dragged from their 
beds and made to march, many dying en route.47  Numerous people, who were healthy 
before the march, died during the journey, due to starvation, dehydration, disease and 
 
36 MAY, supra note 12, at 149. 
37 GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4 at 9. 
38 TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 239; See Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth 
Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late? 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP . LAW 803, 849 (1998). 
39 TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 239. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 240. 
42 GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4, at 9. 
43 Id.  By 1978, there were seven zones, which were further divided into 32 sectors.  The sectors were 
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lack of medicine.48  Corpses rotted in the streets and disease was rampant.49  Phnom Penh, 
once a busy capital, was transformed into an eerie ghost town of twenty thousand.50 
¶10 The survivors of these marches were placed into communal labor teams and kept 
on grueling schedules in the rice fields, often being made to work seven days a week 
under the supervision of the Khmer Rouge overseers.51  The unending labor was 
particularly traumatic for city dwellers unfamiliar with working in the fields.52  Anyone 
who was too weak to work or refused to work was murdered, often within the presence of 
family members.53 
¶11 After four torturous years, countless human rights violations and the deaths of 
nearly one-fifth of the population, the Khmer Rouge was finally deposed when 
Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in 1979.54  The Vietnamese replaced the Khmer 
Rouge with the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, ironically composed of some former 
Khmer Rouge members who had defected to Vietnam. 55  Hun Sen, a former Khmer 
Rouge soldier who was installed as the party’s Foreign Minister, is currently the Prime 
Minster of Cambodia.56  Hun Sen has proved to be uncooperative in the negotiations 
regarding the establishment of the joint tribunal, most likely in an effort to shield himself 
and his Khmer Rouge cadres from prosecution. 57 
III. THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA 
¶12 Hun Sen’s vehement opposition to an international tribunal coupled with his status 
as a former member of the Khmer Rouge casts a questionable light on his sincerity with 
regard to bringing the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice. Hun Sen’s 
comments that the Khmer Rouge were murderers lacks some effect due to the fact that he 
only defected as a soldier of the party when one of the many purges of the Khmer Rouge 
began to focus on his own ranks.58  Additionally, there is evidence that Hun Sen’s 
requests for international assistance with establishing a tribunal may have been strategic 
ploys to divert attention from the bloody military coup he staged in 1997 to overthrow the 
then First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh. 59  Hun Sen’s motives, which appear to 
lack good faith, combined with his power as the Prime Minister and ability to interfere in 
the future trials, casts considerable doubt as to the appropriateness of a joint tribunal. 
¶13 On June 21, 1997 former First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh and then 
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen wrote a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 






52 ABRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267. 





58 Philip Shenon, UN Plans Joint War Crimes Tribunal for Khmer Rouge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/camb odia/99-08-12.htm. 
59 Seth Mydans, Cambodia Purge Said to Claim 40 Victims, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1997, at A8. 
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assistance of the United Nations and international community in bringing 
to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and/or crimes against 
humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979 . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . We are aware of similar efforts to respond to the genocide and crimes 
against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and ask that 
similar assistance be given to Cambodia.  Cambodia does not have the 
resources or expertise to conduct this very important procedure 
We believe that crimes of this magnitude are of concern to all persons in 
the world, as they greatly diminish respect for the most basic human right, 
the right to life. We hope that the United Nations and the international 
community can assist the Cambodian people in establishing the truth about 
this period and bringing those responsible to justice.  Only in this way can 
this tragedy be brought to a full and final conclusion . . . .60 
The letter appeared to be a promising invitation to create an international tribunal 
sponsored by the United Nations.61  The specific request for assistance similar to that 
provided by the United Nations in establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
were particularly misleading. 62  Cambodia’s request did not reflect its true intentions, as it 
never intended to acquiesce to a predominantly international tribunal. 63  Furthermore, 
Hun Sen’s motive for requesting assistance was also highly questionable.  On July 5, 
1997, Hun Sen overthrew Norodom Ranariddh and took power with a bloody military 
coup, killing more than forty political opponents.64  The timing of Hun Sen’s pursuit for 
international prosecution of the Khmer Rouge evokes suspicion that his motives were 
disingenuous.  Hun Sen was extremely concerned with gaining international credibility 
and may have advocated international prosecution as a means of garnering credibility and 
diverting attention from the coup.65 
¶14 In response to Ranariddh and Sen’s letter, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a December 12, 1997 resolution entitled “Situation of Human Rights in 
Cambodia.”66  This resolution was significant as it represented the United Nations’ 
commitment to assisting the Cambodian government with the Khmer Rouge trials and 
gave the mandate to a United Nations group of experts to investigate possible means of 
 
60 See Letter from Norodom Ranariddh, Cambodian First Prime Minister, and Hun Sen, Cambodian 
Second Prime Minister, to Secretary General Annan (June 21, 1997) [hereinafter LETTER FROM NORODOM 
RANARIDDH AND HUN SEN]. 
61 LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 906. 
62 See LETTER FROM NORODOM RANARIDDH AND HUN SEN, supra note 60. 
63 LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 906. 
64 Id. at 907. 
65 LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 907. 
66 Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 70th plen.mtg., 
Agenda Item 112(b), P 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/135 (1998). 
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holding the Khmer Rouge accountable.67  Paragraph 15 of the resolution acknowledges 
that 
the most serious human rights violations in recent history have been 
committed by the Khmer Rouge and that their crimes, including the taking 
and killing of hostages, have continued to the present, and notes with 
concern that no Khmer Rouge leader has been brought to account for his 
crimes.68 
Paragraph 16 of the resolution requests 
the Secretary-General to examine the request by the Cambodian 
authorities for assistance in responding to past serious violations of 
Cambodian and international law, including the possibility of the 
appointment, by the Secretary-General, of a group of experts to evaluate 
the existing evidence and propose further measures, as a means of 
bringing about national reconciliation, strengthening democracy and 
addressing the issue of individual accountability. 69 
Pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 52/135, Secretary-General Kofi Annan established 
a “Group of Experts” with three main goals: “(1) to evaluate the existing evidence and 
determine the nature of the crimes committed; (2) to assess the feasibility of bringing 
Khmer Rouge leaders to justice; and (3) to explore options for trials before international 
or domestic courts.”70  The United Nations Group of Experts (the Experts) traveled 
through Cambodia from July 1998 until February 1999, interviewing government and 
non-governmental officials, current Cambodian citizens and some survivors of the Khmer 
Rouge regime.71  The Experts concluded that the Khmer Rouge had committed, inter alia, 
the international crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.72  Despite 
the difficulty with finding surviving witnesses, who could recall the events of over twenty 
years past and the problem of decaying physical evidence, the Experts found ample 
evidence to proceed with the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders.73 
¶15 The Experts focused the bulk of their report on analyzing the various options for 
bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice.74  In total, the Experts examined five tribunal 
options including: (1) a tribunal established under Cambodian Law, (2) a United Nations 
tribunal, (3) a Cambodian tribunal under United Nations administration (through a 
bilateral agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia), (4) an international 
tribunal established by multilateral treaty and (5) trials in states other than Cambodia.75  
 
67 GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4, at 5-8. 
68 G.A. RES. 52/135, supra  note 66, at para.15. 
69 Id. at para. 16. 
70 Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 948, 949 
(1999). 
71 Id. 
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The Experts cautioned that “the precarious state of the Cambodian domestic judicial 
system, the risk of political influence on the domestic courts, and the contentious 
international law issues involved,” indicate that the “establishment of an ad hoc United 
Nations tribunal seated in an Asia-Pacific nation-state other than Cambodia” would be 
the most prudent tribunal option. 76  The Experts also recommended an independent 
prosecutor, appointed by the United Nations, and even suggested that the Prosecutor from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Tribunal 
for Rwanda assume this role.77  In contrast to his request for United Nations assistance 
with the prosecutions, Hun Sen’s government dismissed the Experts’ conclusions and 
refused to consider a predominately international tribunal as a viable option. 78 
¶16 The United Nations devised a proposal for a tribunal with a majority of foreign 
personnel, hoping that the Cambodian government would accept the concept of a joint 
tribunal.  The joint tribunal as proposed by United Nations Special Representative for 
Human Rights in Cambodia, Thomas Hammarberg, would contain a majority of 
international judges and an international prosecutor.  Hun Sen rejected this proposal and 
the United Nations responded with a second proposal.79  Under the second proposal the 
tribunal was to have one trial chamber and one appeals chamber to prosecute genocide 
and crimes against humanity. 80  This proposal struck a balance in that Cambodian 
personnel would be active participants in the trial alongside a majority of international 
personnel and the tribunal would function under the jurisdiction of Cambodian law with 
implementing legislation, before commencement of the trials.81  Provided that they were 
appropriately qualified, the Cambodians would be able to nominate their own candidates 
for personnel positions and all tribunal personnel, international and domestic, would be 
appointed by the Secretary-General. 82  Hun Sen’s government rejected this second 
proposal. 
¶17 After Cambodia rejected the second proposal, the United States entered into the 
negotiations.83  In October 1999, the Cambodian government endorsed the United States’ 
proposal for a joint tribunal, however this agreement fell apart when the Cambodian 
government rejected it and replaced it with its own proposal for a domestic tribunal that 
would allow limited participation by foreign judges.84  The Cambodian proposal was for a 
joint tribunal, but one that was fundamentally national in character.85  The tribunal would 
have one trial chamber and two appeals chambers, with a majority of Cambodian 
personnel. 86  Another problematic aspect of the proposal is that it included a new 
definition of genocide, which violated the international law against retroactivity.  This 
proposal serves as a prime example of the Cambodian government’s refusal to comply 
 
76 LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 909. 
77 Id.; Craig Etcheson, International Law Weekend Proceedings: Accountability Beckons During a Year 
of Worries for the Khmer Rouge Leadership, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP . L. 507, 510 (2000). 
78 LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 909.   
79 Id. at 910 
80 ETCHESON, supra note 77, at 511. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 911. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id at 911-12. 
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with United Nations’ requests that Cambodia compromise on basic issues of international 
law. 87 
¶18 In an effort to avoid halting the negotiations, the United States and Cambodia 
agreed on a Draft Memorandum of Understanding, which included a modern definition of 
genocide and a domestic tribunal with co-prosecutors and “supermajority” requirements.  
Under this proposal, the tribunal would have three Cambodian and two international 
judges on the trial level and four Cambodian and three international judges on the appeals 
level.  However, the agreement of at least one international judge would be required for 
all decisions.88  Cambodia did not sign the Memorandum of Understanding and insisted 
that the tribunal would not be established, unless both parties signed the document.89  
Although there appeared to be some progress, Cambodia then took a counterproductive 
and rash unilateral action without any regard for the international community, creating 
yet another delay in the negotiations process.  “On August 10, 2001, the Cambodian 
government passed legislation approving Hun Sen’s legally unsound proposal for a joint 
tribunal by a Cambodian National Assembly vote of 86-2 and Senate vote of 51-0.”90  
Shortly thereafter, on February 8, 2002, the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat officially ended negotiations with Cambodia.91 
¶19 The impasse continued until June 2002 when Hun Sen finally wrote the Secretary-
General requesting United Nations assistance.92  On December 18, 2002, the United 
Nations General Assembly passed resolution 57/228 requesting that Secretary-General 
Annan renew talks with Cambodia.93  The United Nations effectively endorsed the 
creation of the controversial joint tribunal with a majority of Cambodian judges.94  The 
resolution made a series of recommendations to the United Nations negotiating team.95 
First, the resolution directed that the Extraordinary Chambers have subject 
matter jurisdiction consistent with the Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and personal 
jurisdiction over the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge.  Second, the 
resolution called for the exercise of this jurisdiction in accordance with 
international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set 
out in articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
 
87 Id. at 912. 
88 See Tribunal Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and the Royal Government 
of Cambodia, PHNOM PENH POST , Issue 9/22, Oct. 27 – Nov. 9, 2000, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/cgp/mou_v3.htm; See also  The Secretary-General, Press Release, Secretary-General 
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Political Rights.  Third, the resolution called for the independence and 
impartiality of judges and prosecutors . . . .96 
¶20 After Hans Corell, the United Nations legal counsel, met with Cambodian officials 
in Phnom Penh on March 17, 2003, he announced that they had reached a draft 
agreement97 with Cambodia on the status of a court.98  It took five years and eleven 
rounds of negotiations before Om Yentieng, an advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen, 
stated, “We have agreed on a draft cooperation agreement in which the United Nations 
will assist Cambodia in the proceedings of a special tribunal.”99  On May 13, 2003, a 
consensus of the United Nations General Assembly approved the March Agreement, 
which was officially adopted by the Cambodian National Assembly in October 2004.100 
¶21 Though the March Agreement may appear to signify progress towards bringing the 
Khmer Rouge to justice, it could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory.  Hun Sen’s refusal to 
accept any suggestions for an international tribunal, despite his specific call for United 
Nations assistance, indicates that he may be acting in bad faith and for his own self-
interest.  For instance, Hun Sen’s assurances to the Cambodian public that low-ranking 
members of the Khmer Rouge will not be subject to trial may be prompted by the fact 
that as a former Khmer Rouge soldier Hun Sen fears that if all officials of the Khmer 
Rouge are subject to trial, he may be called before the court.101  Regardless, the fact that 
Hun Sen, who has a significant conflict of interest, is capable of dictating who will be 
called before the court clearly defies the basis of impartiality that is a cornerstone of the 
judiciary. 102  Furthermore, the structure of the March Agreement fails to safeguard against 
potential interference of the Cambodian government or to address the concerns regarding 
a lack of judicial independence and the limited number of competent Cambodian 
judges.103 
IV.  THE MARCH AGREEMENT: THE STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT TRIBUNAL LEAVES THE 
TRIALS VULNERABLE TO POLITICAL INTERFERENCE 
¶22 The March Agreement’s ambitious attempt to employ Cambodian and international 
judges in the Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia is an untested and 
highly risky approach to war crimes prosecution. 104  In contrast to the Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda ad hoc tribunals, which had the neutrality of a strictly international tribunal, the 
joint tribunal mixes foreign judicial participation with the domestic judicial establishment 
in a manner that lacks the safeguards of a strictly international tribunal. 105  Specifically, 
the structure of the joint tribunal, as delineated by the March Agreement, places too 
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heavy a burden on Cambodia’s underdeveloped judicial system and relinquishes too 
much power to the Cambodian government, which suffers from a history of systematic 
corruption. 
A. The Lack of Competent Judges and Their Vulnerability to Manipulation 
¶23 The tribunal’s lack of a majority of international judges could lead to unjust trials, 
as a result of governmental manipulation of Cambodian judges.  The composition of 
judges is established in Article 3 of the March Agreement, which stipulates that there will 
be three Cambodian judges and two international judges in the Trial Chamber and four 
Cambodian judges and three international judges in the Supreme Court Chamber.106  A 
fair and just executive as well as an independent judiciary are essential to the integrity of 
a joint tribunal. 107  Cambodia’s political structure is characterized by a corrupt executive 
with a long history of interfering with its weak judicial system, which suffers from a 
dearth of competent judges.108  The Cambodian Government itself has acknowledged 
these problems in the reports it has filed as a party to the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).109  In its report on compliance with the ICCPR, 
Cambodia states, “The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by law.  However, 
practice has shown that, owing to interference and pressure from other branches, the 
courts are not fully independent.”110  The government further noted that 
Given that the Supreme Council of Justice has not yet been established, 
the trial courts, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court do not yet 
function well, because of the lack of competent staff and documents 
available for consultation. Some judges are obliged to seek the opinion of 
the Ministry of Justice on the interpretation of articles and the 
determination of offenses; the Minister of Justice makes recommendations 
and issues guidelines to enable the judges to apply laws and procedures 
correctly. Such actions might weaken the independence of the judiciary to 
some extent, but under the present circumstances, in which judges are not 
sufficiently experienced, they need guidance in order to perform their 
work.111 
¶24 Judges in Cambodia have little to no physical security or professional 
independence.112  High political officials instruct Cambodian judges to rule a certain way 
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on cases and threaten their safety if they do not rule as instructed.113  Since 1993, physical 
attacks on courts have occurred frequently and in April of 2003, a prominent judge was 
assassinated in the middle of the day as he drove to work in Phnom Penh. 114  In highly 
politicized cases, it is not uncommon for the executive to negotiate prearranged pardons 
to demonstrate its power over the judiciary. 115 
¶25 In addition to the judiciary’s susceptibility to political influence, there is also the 
logistical challenge of finding Cambodian judges who have experience in international 
law, international humanitarian law and international human rights.  During the Khmer 
Rouge Rule, the court system was completely abandoned and numerous members of the 
judiciary were killed in an attempt to create a classless, homogenous society. 116  The 
Khmer Rouge viewed lawyers and judges as intellectuals capable of threatening their 
rule.117  Some legal professionals were fortunate enough merely to be stripped of their 
positions, while those less fortunate were systematically murdered.118  Even today, 
Cambodian society suffers from a deficit of qualified and competent personnel to staff 
the judiciary. 119 
¶26 The lack of confidence among the Cambodian citizenry in the abilities of judges 
and lawyers is yet another critical factor that may undermine the Khmer Rouge trials.  In 
a study funded by the Cambodian Genocide Project at Yale University, every single 
person out of twenty five survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime stated that a trial could 
not be held in Cambodia because the judiciary is too weak and corrupt.120 
B. No Independent, International Prosecutor 
¶27 The Cambodian government’s insistence upon hiring one international and one 
Cambodian prosecutor, instead of just one independent, international prosecutor, subjects 
the trials to yet another avenue of political interference.121  The prosecutor is responsible 
for conducting pre- indictment investigations, analyzing evidence and interviewing 
potential witness.122  It is essential that all of these tasks are carried out by an objective 
and independent prosecutor and, given Cambodia’s track record, it seems unlikely that 
the Cambodian prosecutor will be able to act independently. 123  In the past, prosecutors in 
Cambodia have had to seek approval from politicians before determining who to indict.  
Furthermore, the presence of the Cambodian prosecutor can be used to delay the trials.124  
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Cambodian and international prosecutor disagree.125  The special panel is to consist of 
three judges selected by Cambodia’s Supreme Council of Magistracy and two by the 
Secretary-General and decisions are made by reaching a supermajority. 126  Each 
prosecutor or investigating judge has to submit a written statement giving the reasons for 
their differing opinions.127  Thus, the Cambodian government can bring the trials to a 
slow crawl by instructing the Cambodian members of the tribunal to challenge all of the 
decisions of the international prosecutors and investigating judges.128 
C. Cambodia’s Poor Track Record in Adhering to International Standards of Justice 
¶28 In addition to Hun Sen’s lack of cooperation and his effort to stall progression 
towards the establishment of the tribunal, the illegitimate “show” trials of Pol Pot and 
Ieng Sary provide more direct evidence of the long-standing lack of respect for the 
standards of justice in Cambodia.129  In 1979, the Vietnamese- installed regime established 
a tribunal and claimed to try the Khmer Rouge for their crimes.130  The proceedings 
however, were at best an attempt to appease Cambodians and the international 
community and at worst a deceptive plan to gloss over the massive human rights 
violations and allow numerous former Khmer Rouge members to remain 
unaccountable.131  The trials focused only on Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge’s Prime Minister, 
and Ieng Sary, the regime’s Deputy Prime Minister, holding them responsible for all 
crimes of the Khmer Rouge.132  Despite the trials conference of blame of all Khmer 
Rouge atrocities on these two men, they remained unpunished.133  Neither Pol Pot, nor 
Ieng Sary were at the trials and they were sentenced to death in absentia.  There was no 
effort made to capture these men, both of whom were supposedly hiding at the time.134 
¶29 These trials lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the international community for 
several reasons.135  “First, the two leaders were tried in absentia, a violation of the 
[ICCPR].”136  Article 14(d) states that all people have the right “[t]o be tried in his 
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing.”137  “Second, the Decree Law establishing the ‘People’s Revolutionary 
Tribunal’ contained language denouncing the two defendants, functionally assuming their 
guilt, a violation of the international norm of the ‘presumption of innocence.’138  Third, 
the definition of genocide used at the trial did not comport with the internationally 
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accepted definition.”139  The Decree Law defined genocide to include “planned massacres 
of groups of innocent people; expulsion of inhabitants of cities and villages in order to 
concentrate them and force them to do hard labor in conditions leading to their physical 
and mental destruction; wiping out religion; destroying political, cultural and social 
structures and family and social relations.”140  This law, which deviates from the 
internationally accepted definition of genocide in the Convention on the Punishment of 
and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) was created to ensure 
the guilt of the defendants.141  The Genocide Convention defines genocide as 
acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious groups as such: (a) Killing members of the 
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.142 
¶30 The Cambodian government’s blatant disregard for the prevailing standards of 
international law in its establishment of the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal raises 
significant concerns regarding whether it will comply with international law during the 
Khmer Rouge trials held by the joint tribunal. 
D. The Supermajority Formula of the Tribunal is Flawed. 
¶31 The Cambodian Government’s refusal to clarify the supermajority formula with the 
United Nations may be motivated by the desire to keep the decision-making process 
ambiguous in an effort to exert control over the outcomes of the trials.  The 
unprecedented supermajority formula, which is codified in Article 4 of the March 
Agreement, is fraught with ambiguities that could render the trials completely 
ineffective.143  The United States was an ardent supporter of an international tribunal and 
it devised the supermajority formula as a compromise to appease Hun Sen. 144  The 
supermajority offers some protection from political interference by requiring that if 
decisions are not made unanimously, “a decision by the Trial Chamber shall require the 
affirmative vote of at least four judges [and a] decision by the Supreme Court Chamber 
shall require the affirmative vote of at least five judges.”145  However, there is a 
potentially dangerous flaw in the supermajority provision of the March Agreement 
regarding the process for reaching a verdict.146  The procedure delineated for decision-
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making in Article 4 of the March Agreement does not specify in which circumstances a 
supermajority is necessary to reach a decision. 147  Furthermore, the March Agreement 
provides no directive as to how to proceed if a supermajority is not reached.148  The 
United States, looking to its own legal practices, has suggested that the result would be a 
“hung jury” and there would be a retrial.149  However, Cambodian law does not contain 
the hung jury procedure.150  Thus, this process risks a split decision between Cambodian 
and international judges that could render the court incapable of reaching a decision and, 
even worse, result in inappropriate acquittals.151 
¶32 The United Nations recognized the potential problems that could arise out of the 
supermajority formula and repeatedly discussed the issue with Cambodia in an effort to 
agree upon a solution. 152  Cambodia’s insistence on keeping the supermajority formula 
vague could stem from its intent to leave itself a judicial loophole through which to 
influence the Khmer Rouge trials. 
V. THE SPECIAL COURT IN SIERRA LEONE 
¶33 A tribunal fashioned after the Special Court seated in Sierra Leone may have been a 
more effective accountability mechanism for bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice than 
the joint tribunal.  The structure of Sierra Leone’s Special Court could potentially fulfill 
several of the goals cited by supporters of the joint tribunal, while avoiding substantial 
risks.  The joint tribunal as it was created by the March Agreement places too heavy of a 
burden on the underdeveloped Cambodian judiciary, which has long been manipulated by 
the Cambodian Government. 
¶34 Supporters of Cambodia’s joint tribunal envision that in addition to bringing justice 
to the victims of the Khmer Rouge, the tribunal will create a legal framework for 
Cambodian courts to follow in the future.  Additionally, they hope that the effective 
administration of justice through the joint tribunal will enable the Cambodian people to 
witness the “first successful domestic operation of the rule of law” and begin developing 
confidence in their judicial system. 153  Proponents of the joint tribunal also argue that the 
insistence that the international community is the only entity capable of conducting the 
trials of the Khmer Rouge is paternalistic and may be resented by the Cambodian 
citizenry. 154  This argument is reinforced by the fact that the international community as a 
whole remained silent for years with regard to Khmer Rouge accountability and provided 
political support to the Khmer Rouge, which was allowed to occupy Cambodia’s seat at 
the United Nations throughout the 1980s.155 
¶35 Unfortunately, the weakness of Cambodia’s judiciary combined with systematic 
political corruption yields dim prospects for the success of the joint tribunal.  However, 
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Special Court would allow Cambodians to participate and have a stake in the Khmer 
Rouge trials, while providing safeguards against governmental interference.  The Special 
Court in Sierra Leone is divided into one trial and one appellate chamber with the 
possibility that a second trial chamber may be set up upon the request of the President of 
the Court or the Secretary-General of the United Nations.156  Article 2 of the Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of 
a Special Court called for Sierra Leone to appoint one judge to the trial chamber and two 
judges to the appeals chamber and provided that the Secretary-General appoint the 
remainder of the judges.157 
¶36 The format of the Special Court avoids the supermajority problem of the joint 
tribunal because rulings are made on a majority basis and at least one international judge 
must agree with the decision in order to make it stand.158  This structure is, therefore, 
more likely to yield consistent rulings.  Furthermore, in the Special Court, the 
international judges provide a safeguard against governmental interference.  This would 
not only facilitate the process of fair trials in Cambodia, but it would also give citizens 
some assurance that the courts will work in an unbiased manner.  Cambodian judges 
while working alongside international counterparts could potentially experience trying 
cases free of political coercion and interference for the first time in their careers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶37 There is no ideal template for holding trials after gross human rights violations and, 
thus, the selection of an appropriate accountability mechanism involves a complex 
calculus of numerous factors.  The primary goal of the Cambodian tribunal is to conduct 
fair trials that will hold perpetrators responsible for their crimes and formally 
acknowledge the wrongs committed against victims.  In addition to this primary goal, the 
tribunal may also be established in an effort to rehabilitate the country’s judicial system, 
restore the citizenry’s confidence in its domestic judicial system and deter potential future 
perpetrators.  All of these goals must be considered in light of Cambodia’s political 
stability and judicial system. 
¶38 In the case of Cambodia, a country characterized by political corruption and a weak 
judiciary, the trials of the Khmer Rouge will require a high level of international 
guidance to shelter the trials from executive interference.  The United Nations’ approval 
of the March Agreement over the objections of Secretary-General Annan is surprising 
due to its former insistence upon an international tribunal, the report of the Group of 
Experts and Hun Sen’s obvious lack of good faith throughout the negotiations.  
Furthermore, Hun Sen’s extreme conflict of interest in the trials due to his status as a 
former Khmer Rouge member who could face prosecution if the tribunal were to expand 
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its reach to low ranking officials, provides him with a strong incentive to interfere with 
the trials. 
¶39 Proponents of the joint tribunal, who argue that the trials will help Cambodia 
establish a domestic legal framework, fail to recognize that the present judicial system is 
too weak to undergo a massive rehabilitation without substantial international assistance.  
The March Agreement does not provide adequate safeguards against the manipulation of 
government officials interested in engineering the outcome of the Khmer Rouge trials. 
Without a majority of international judges to ensure fair trials, the joint tribunal runs a 
high risk of being ineffective at bringing justice to victims of the Khmer Rouge.  If the 
tribunal fails to achieve this primary goal, the secondary goals of rehabilitating the 
judiciary and restoring confidence in the judicial system will not come to fruition. 
¶40 A more prudent approach to the Cambodian trials would have been to create a court 
similar to Sierra Leone’s Special Court.  This alternative model may have resulted in a 
beneficial balance of allowing Cambodian judges to participate in the Khmer Rouge trials 
while a majority of international judges served as protectors of judicial independence.  A 
system resembling the Special Court possesses far fewer risks than the joint tribunal and 
would have enhanced Cambodia’s prospects for achieving both the primary goal of 
bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice and the secondary goal of creating a foundation for 
a strong and independent judiciary in Cambodia. 
